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NOTES

dissenting Justice is probably more in accord with the intent of
the parties. The majority's theory would indicate that even if
the insured owned several automobiles, he might take out a policy on just one and all would receive full coverage, at least in the
absence of an intent to deceive.16
The particular problem presented in the instant case seems
to be remedied by the use of the new policy forms which provide
in substance that an owned automobile means an automobile described in the policy, or a newly acquired automobile which replaces a described automobile, or a newly acquired automobile
in addition to the described automobile when notice is given of
its acquisition within thirty days. 17 Should similar problems
arise in ascertaining the intention of parties to automobile liability policies, however, it is submitted that an obvious correlation between premium and risk should be among the factors
carefully weighed; if premiums are based on the ownership of
just one automobile, certainly neither party has reason to expect
uncompensated coverage for any other owned vehicle.
Wendell G. Lindsay, Jr.

OBLIGATIONS -

ERROR AS TO SUBJECT MATTER -

AVOIDANCE

OF INSURANCE RELEASES IN LOUISIANA

Plaintiff, injured in a collision between a train and the car
driven by her husband, sought damages for personal injury
from her husband's automobile insurer and the railroad. The
defendant insurer pleaded res judicata on the basis of a purported written release obtained by the insurer from plaintiff
and her husband. The defendant railroad filed an exception of
no right of action based on the alleged release of the co-tortfeasor insurer.' Plaintiff sought to prove, by parol evidence,
(1948) Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So. 2d 483
(1947) Muse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 La. 605, 192 So. 72 (1939).
16. LA. R.S. 22:619 (1950) provides in part that "no oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of an insurance contract ...
shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the contract or prevent it from attaching, unless the misrepresentation or warranty is made with the intent to deceive." Consequently, the presence of such intent would be necessary for the incorrect declaration to cause avoidance of the contract on a theory of warranty.
See Comment, 22 LA. L. REV. 190 (1961).
17. See the definition of owned automobile in note 3 supra.
1. The release was granted only to the insurer of the automobile, but there
was no express reservation of rights in the release to sue the railroad company.
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that the release was granted under circumstances such as to

result in error as to the subject matter on her part. The trial
court sustained both plea and exception, and the court of appeal
affirmed. 2 On writ of certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed and remanded. Held, a release signed while in error
as to the subject matter due to misleading representations and
conduct of the insurer's agent as shown by parol evidence is

void and can support neither a plea of res judicata made by the
party to whom the release was given nor an exception of no
right of action made by his co-tortfeasor. Moak v. American
Auto. Ins. Co., 242 La. 160, 134 So. 2d 911 (1961).
Releases granted by parties who have potential claims
against insurers are governed by the Louisiana Civil Code articles on transaction or compromise, 3 an agreement in which
two or more persons by mutual consent adjust their differences

to prevent litigation. 4 To be properly confected, the release must

be written 5 and complete in itself;6 it is then res judicata be7
tween the parties.
Releases cannot be rescinded on the ground of error of law
or of lesion.8 Consequently, an attack merely on the ground the
The driver of the automobile and the railroad company were allegedly joint tortfeasors. It has been held, on the basis of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2203 (1870), that
a release of one joint tortfeasor bars an action against another joint tortfeasor
in the absence of a written reservation of such rights in the release. Reid v.
Lowden, 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939) ; Long v. Globe Indem. Co., 144 So. 2d
275 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962), cert. denied; Williams v. Marionneaux, 116 So. 2d
57 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959). See Note, 13 TUL. L. REv. 642 (1939).
2. Moak v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 127 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3071-3083 (1870). E.g., Moak v. American Auto. Ins.
Co., 242 La. 160, 134 So. 2d 911 (1961); Puchner v. Employer's Liab. Assur.
Corp., 198 La. 921, 5 So. 2d 288 (1941) ; Thompson v. Kivett & Reel, Inc., 25
So. 2d 124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946).
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3071 (1870).

5. Ibid.
6. A release must contain all elements of the agreement; there must be no
necessity to refer to parol evidence to explain or establish its terms. Johnson v.
National Cas. Co., 176 So. 235 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937). See also Texas
Creosoting Co. v. Tyler, 180 La. 535, 156 So. 814 (1934) ; Francois v. Maison
Blanche Realty Co., 134 La. 215, 63 So. 880 (1914).
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3078 (1870). It has been held that a single wrongful
or negligent act causing damage to both the person and property of an individual
gives rise to a single cause of action in favor of that individual. Thus, a release
granted in settlement of the property damage for instance, bars a subsequent
action for personal injury, since the cause of action was rendered res judicata by
the release. Accordingly, when a release is attacked, it can be held valid or
invalid only in its entirety. Darensbourg v. Columbia Cas. Co., 140 So. 2d 241
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied; Thompson v. Kivett & Reel, Inc., 25
So. 2d 124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946). See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 425
(1960) (prohibits splitting of single cause of action "for the purpose of bringing
separate actions on different portions thereof").
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3078 (1870) ; Stoufflet v. Duplantis, 208 La. 186, 23
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amount received was insufficient relative to the severity of injury sustained is of no availY Releases can be rescinded, 10 however, when there appears vice of consent consisting of error in
the person or matter in dispute, or fraud or violence." Since a
party is presumed to have read and understood the release before signing it, an allegation of simple failure to read the instrument is insufficient. 12 Nevertheless, courts have rescinded
releases upon proof that illiteracy, lack of intelligence or education, or similar circumstances rendered a party unable to understand the subject matter and nature and effect of the release,
or more susceptible to fraud or deception. 18 Other considerations
indicating fraud or error sufficient to vitiate the release are
the insurer's imposition and insistence upon settlement within
So. 2d 41 (1945); Young v. Glynn, 171 La. 371, 131 So. 51 (1930); .Jackson
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 199 So. 419 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940) ; Beck
v. Continental Cas. Co., 145 So. 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
9. Jackson v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 199 So. 419 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1940) ; Spears v. St. Charles Dairy, 194 So. 738 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940)
Beck v. Continental Cas. Co., 145 So. 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
10. A party who alleges the nullity of a release must bring a direct action,
which may be combined with a claim for damages, for rescission. Poole v. Home
Ins. Co., 75 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Chapin v. Federal Transp.
Co., 70 So. 2d 189 (La. App. I1st Cir. 1953) ; Beck v. Continental Cas. Co., 145
So. 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933). A party urging rescission must also tender or
return the amount received under the release. See Ackerman v. McShane, 43
La. Ann. 507, 9 So. 483 (1891) ; Poole v. Home Ins. Co., 75 So. 2d 385 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1954) ; Davis v. Whatley, 175 So. 422 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937). But see
Lervick v. White Top Cabs, 10 So. 2d 67 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942), cert. denied;
Brandon v. Gottlieb, 16 La. App. 676, 132 So. 283 (1st Cir. 1931). Failure to
tender or return the amount received under the release must be raised in the
pleadings and proved by the party asserting such failure. Moak v. American Auto.
Ins. Co., 242 La. 160, 134 So. 2d 911 (1961) ; Miller v. Judice, 149 So. 2d 715
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3079 (1870). E.g., Wise v. Prescott, 151 So. 2d 356
(La. 1963) ; Davenport v. F. B. Dubach Lumber Co., 112 La. 943, 36 So. 812
(1904) ; Miller v. Judice, 149 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Waagen v.
Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ;
McDaniel v. Audubon Ins. Co., 121 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; Lervick
v. White Top Cabs, 10 So. 2d 67 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942), cert. denied; Johnson v. National Cas. Co., 176 So. 235 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) ; Davis v. Whatley,
175 So. 422 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) ; Brandon v. Gottlieb, 16 La. App. 676,
132 So. 283 (1st Cir. 1931).
12. E.g., Tooke v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 122 So. 2d 109 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1960) ; Blades v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 95 So. 2d 209
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
13. Davenport v. F. B. Dubach Lumber Co., 112 La. 943, 36 So. 812 (1904)
(plaintiff in great pain and under influence of opiates when induced to sign
release) ; Waagen V. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 831 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1962) (release obtained from Norwegian seaman who spoke little
English); McDaniel v. Audubon Ins. Co., 121 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1960) (illiterate) ; Lervick v. White Top Cabs, 10 So. 2d 67 (La. App. Orl. Cir
1942), cert. denied (Norwegian citizen without fluent understanding of English
induced to sign release within half hour after injury while lying on rolling table
in hospital) ; Johnson v. National Cas. Co., 176 So. 235 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937)
(release obtained late at night from illiterate parents of injured boy) ; Davis v.
Whatley, 175 So. 422 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) (illiterate).
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a short time after the injury14 and concealment of material facts
or deception practiced by the insurer's agent. 15
In the instant case the Supreme Court unequivocally stated
that parol evidence was admissible "to show error as to the
subject matter of a compromise.' 6 The court then concluded
that the agent's conduct and representation during negotiations
caused plaintiff to sign the release under such error as to the
subject matter, which is sufficient ground for rescission. 7 The
court disapproved two appellate court cases which had indicated
alleged misleading representations by the insurer resulting in
error as to the subject matter are of no import in determining
whether a release may be rescinded.' 8 A recent appellate court
decision rendered subsequent to, and in accord with the rationale
of, the instant case has held error as to the subject matter resulting from breach of the insurer's duty to make clear to the
insured his rights under the policy sufficient ground for rescission of the release.' 9
It is submitted that the instant case properly restricts prior
jurisprudence which had indicated that misleading representations by the insurer while negotiating a release are of no import
in deciding whether there is sufficient ground for rescission.
Furthermore, it is now clear a party may show by parol evidence
that the misleading representations resulted in such error.
Frank Fontenot

14. Wise v. Prescott, 151 So. 2d 356, 361 (La. 1963); Waagen v. Indiana
Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (release
obtained
days after accident); Lervick v. white Top Cabs, 10 So. 2d 67
'(La. App.three
Orl. Cir.
1942), cert. denied (release obtained half hour after accident) ;
Davis v. Whatley, 175 So. 422 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) (release obtained one
day after accident).
15. Brandon v. Gottlieb, 16 La. App. 676, 132 So. 283 (1st Cir. 1931) (insurer's agent, after conducting investigation of accident, disclosed some findings
to plaintiff but suppressed material facts which led plaintiff to sign the release
under error).
16. 242 La. at 166, 134 So. 2d at 913.
17. Rather than limiting the effects of the release to settlement for property
damages, the court rescinded the release in its entirety to avoid splitting a single
cause of action. See note 7 supra, and accompanying text.
18. Tooke v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 122 So. 2d 109 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1960) ; Blades v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 95 So. 2d 209 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957).
19. Miller v. Judice, 149 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (defendant
Was insurer of injured party).

